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ABSTRACT
In this article, we will explore how local politics of policy, in the interaction with
governance mechanisms, have produced specific polity outcomes in the irrigation
sector of Andhra Pradesh. The water sector of Andhra Pradesh, which has been
struggling within inefficiency, poor performance, deterioration, and lack of
participation as elsewhere in India, has undergone substantial reforms aiming at
Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM). Previous research has indicated how
reform policy choices were contested and mediated by relevant actors and how this
affected the outcome in key areas of irrigation management. This is referred to as
the politics of policy. We will look at multi-level governance in a situation where
different tiers represent different institutional basis, and argue that the politics of
policy at multiple levels of governance can be perceived as a form of support
and/or resilience by actors to new governance mechanisms/arrangements. 
Keywords: Water sector reforms, Irrigation management, Participation, Multi-
level governance.
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the eighties and nineties, India struggled with low cropping intensities, low yields,
inequity and poor maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure. At the same time, the sector
also faced various political, institutional and financial challenges, such as low revenues
and poor cost-recovery, which prevented an effective approach to increase production and
improve the maintenance and operation of its irrigation infrastructure. In other words, the
agricultural production, and maintenance of India’s irrigation infrastructure was clearly
related to issues of governance, and embedded in the national political, economic and
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institutional context. India’s agricultural and water sector policy was not only shaped by
the changing features of the eco-system (soil characteristics, surface and ground water,
inundation, climate, vegetation, land use) , the composition and interests of the multiple
water users, but also by global economic trends, trade relations and donor pressures. 
Environmental problems such as temporal and spatial-based water scarcity are
topics which are not necessarily confined to boundaries. India’s policies with regard to
water flow, water augmentation and withdrawal also affected the water flow to its
neighboring countries, in particular Pakistan and Bangladesh. For example, India’s
choice to construct the Farakka dam was based upon the wish to provide its farmers
with reliable irrigation water supply. From the moment it was operational, in 1975, it
affected the availability of water for users downstream in Bangladesh, which resulted
in opposition, negotiations and treaties (1977 and 1996). Tanzeema and Faisal (2001)
indicate how this influenced the bilateral relation between India and Bangladesh:
“Sharing the Ganges has become a contentious issue since then, embittering the
bilateral relation of the two neighboring countries/…/About 30 million people of
Bangladesh depend on its water. The Ganges maintains the environment and ecology
of the south-western region that constitutes about 37% of the total area of Bangladesh”
(Tanzeema & Faisal, 2001, p. 15). This is just one of many issues with potential for
conflict. In table 1, we give some examples of potential for conflict on environmental
issues at multiple levels of governance and how institutional functioning or
governance plays a role in this. 
What is not included in this overview, are (perceived) threats to personal and
organizational interests, such as one’s socio-economic position; transfer or
responsibilities to other organizations; or the joint responsibility for revenue
collection. These play a key-role in water sector reforms in Andhra Pradesh, as we will
see in the case study.
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Table 1: Conflict issues and institutional failure
Institutional functioning/
Level and issues Examples of conflict/disputes governance
Global and international level: 
Climate Change, Trade, Conflict over environmental Availability of monitoring 
Sustainable Development standards; conflict between standards; adjustment of 
and Biodiversity the private and public sector over research data at national level 
the provisions of biodiversity or for, or under pressure of, 
climate change conventions; over international organizations. 
emissions and carbon trade
(Continued)
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Institutional functioning/
Level and issues Examples of conflict/disputes governance
Regional/multi-country level: 
Regional water basin Conflict over dams, freshwater Availability of monitoring 
management, Multinational withdrawal for irrigation, standards and procedures, 
Environmental Agreements navigation, and power from pressure of large industries 
transboundary river basin, in the negotiation or 
cross-boundary aquifers, disputes implementation process to 
over discharge of pollutants and avoid negative impacts 
waste water affecting other for the industry
countries
National / macro level:
Natural Resource Disputes over the implementation Institutional capacity for the
Management, Environment of environmental policies and enforcement of environmental 
Policy; Irrigation Policy; plans, in terms of implementation regulations; political alliances; 
Agricultural policy, procedure; risk and uncertainty; corruption of police forces; 
National Conservation potential adverse effects, and stakeholders’ participation in 
Strategy; National equity concerns; discharge of the formulation of policies; 
Environmental pollutants and waste water into financial mechanisms and 
Management Action Plan rivers revenues for implementation 
Sub-National level: 
Natural Resource Disputes over the lack of voice in Communication, consultation 
Management, water the formulation / implementation and participation of relevant 
program, infrastructure, of environmental policies and stakeholders and local 
livelihoods plans, in terms of implementation populations; compliance to, 
procedures; risk and uncertainty; or circumvention of, existing 
potential adverse effects, and rules and regulations, law 
equity concerns; disputes over enforcement; political 
project management; off site alliances; financial 
environmental impacts mechanisms and revenues for 
implementation 
Community/ societal level: 
Social mobilization, Disputes over fishery grounds Communication, consultation 
local action for between private and communal and participation of relevant 
environmental natural land owners; disputes over lease population groups and 
resource management, arrangements; over land stakeholders; compliance with, 
livelihoods boundaries and property rights; or circumvention of, existing 
over resource capture by local rules and regulations, law 
elite; and conflict over off-site enforcement; political 
environmental impacts affecting alliances
livelihoods.
(Source: Van der Molen and Rahman, 2007)
1.1. Politics of Policy
How can we understand the context in which these reforms were embedded? What are
the challenges that bureaucrats face in the implementation of the reforms? While
multi-level and multi-actor governance has added complexity to the processes of
decision making and implementation, it does – by its very nature – allow more groups
to have stakes in the process, to defend their interests and try to influence the outcome.
This participation and agency of relevant stakeholders is generally expected to
improve the decision making and the quality of the outcomes, and strengthen
acceptance and legitimacy of policies. This understanding is somewhat simplistic, as
it assumes all users have similar interests (in participation) and impact (on outcomes).
To understand the challenges, it is useful to refer to the ‘politics of policy’. The
‘politics of policy’ refers to the dynamics, process and practices by which policy is
formulated, adjusted, interpreted, implemented, promoted, resisted and reconstructed
by relevant actors, including actors at the lower receiving end. The politics of policy
is embedded in, and at the same time shaping, social structures, also known as ‘the
duality of social structure’ (Giddens, 1984; Scott 2001, p. 75).
Important for this study are the ‘politics of policy implementation’ and ‘politics of
policy resistance’. The first concept, the ‘politics of policy implementation’ identifies
the social, financial, legal, political and organizational challenges of implementing
public policy and enforcing public law. The second concept, the ‘politics of policy
resistance’, is based on the assumption that policy transfer, in particular in a context
of asymmetric interdependence, will result in some policy resistance and that the
location and nature of this resistance depends partly on the features of policy transfer
(e.g. voluntary or coercive transfer; external or internal). Policies are embedded in
social relations, power structures, negotiation and cooperation practices that exist in
society. Accordingly, Bache and Taylor argue that, “the nature of resistance to policy
transfer will be shaped by past practices and embedded interests” (Bache and Taylor,
2003, p. 283).  Policy actors mobilize individual and collective resources, networks
and location in order to be able to intervene and influence the policy process. 
Although Bache and Taylor (2003) are drawing on anthropology and
democratization studies, with specific reference to policy transfers in a context of
asymmetric interdependence between ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’, we argue that the above
statement applies to water sector reforms in Andhra Pradesh as well. In the context of
Andhra Pradesh, the emphasis has shifted from a state-oriented approach – with a
stronghold for the Irrigation Department – towards multi-tier Participatory Irrigation
Management (PIM). The Participatory Irrigation Management approach is based on
multiple levels of governance and encouraged an approach with management
responsibilities for both farmers (landholders, titleholders, tenants) and the Irrigation
Department. As shifts in the distribution of political, legal, financial, organizational and
informational resources (and thus power resources) are part and parcel of institutional
reform processes, this will logically affect the nature of the interdependence between
the actors and thereby the support for, and resistance against, the reforms.
Much of the localized support for, or resistance against, the reforms is based on
changes in the rules that “operate configurationally to structure an action situation”
(Ostrom, 1986, p. 19): 
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1. Position rules that specify a set of positions and how many participants hold each
position;
2. boundary rules that specify how participants are chosen to hold these positions and
how participants leave these positions;
3. scope rules that specify the set of outcomes that may be affected and the external
inducements and/or costs assigned to each of these outcomes;
4. authority rules that specify the set of actions assigned to a position at a particular
node;
5. aggregation rules that specify the decision function to be used at a particular node
to map actions into intermediate or final outcomes;
6. information rules that authorize channels of communication among participants in
positions and specifying the language and form in which communication will take
place;
7. pay-off rules that prescribe how costs & benefits are to be distributed between
participants.
1.2. Outline
This article looks at some of the key-expectations and envisioned outcomes of the
water sector reforms in Andhra Pradesh, in particular the finance mechanisms for
better operation and maintenance, improved water delivery and irrigated area, and
more accountable and realistic local irrigation revenue collection. The questions which
will be addressed throughout the article and again in the conclusions are:
1. What were the features of the water sector reform in Andhra Pradesh?
2. Who are the policy actors and how have they reshaped the implementation process
and the envisaged outcomes of the irrigation reforms?
3. Was there a common understanding and shared perception of the environmental
problems to be dealt with throughout the multi-governance system? 
4. How is the innate competition between different tiers resolved, and with what pay-
offs to the different constituent parts? 
5. How does multi-level governance function in a situation where the different tiers
represent fundamentally different institutional basis (traditional, charismatic,
rational forms of government) and how does this affect the outcomes?
6. Does institutional fragmentation lead to better outcomes (as a result of ability to
respond flexibly to local realities) or to worse outcomes (due to regulatory
unpredictability)?
1.3. Methodology
The findings are based on empirical research conducted from March 2001 to July
2002, and additional fieldwork during intervals from 2002–2004. The selected site for
a case study was the Madhira Branch Canal (MBC) located on the Nagarjuna Sagar
Left Bank Canal (NSLC), in Andhra Pradesh. The research adopted an
interdisciplinary approach, using a combination of qualitative research tool, such as
participant observation at the village and WUA level, semi-structured interviews with
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irrigation bureaucrats and WUA leaders; and group and key-informant discussions
with WUA members. 
2. FEATURES OF THE ANDHRA PRADESH IRRIGATION REFORM
In 2002 India adjusted its National Water Policy and recognized the need for
restructuring India’s water sector. Five years earlier, in 1997, the State of Andhra
Pradesh already initiated such a process. Andhra Pradesh is known as the rice bowl of
India. The state has been a leading participant in the Green Revolution in the country.
The state also has been benefited by the development of irrigation infrastructure which
took place during both pre and postcolonial governments. However, decline in public
investment and lack of users’ participation in irrigation system management has led to
deterioration of irrigation infrastructure. To address these challenges, Andhra Pradesh
(AP) adopted far-reaching irrigation management reforms, sometimes also referred to
as the ‘Big Bang’ approach of Andhra Pradesh. 
These were put down in the Andhra Pradesh Farmers Management of Irrigation
Systems Act in 1997 (Ananda and Crase, 2006, p. 931). The Act is the reflection of a
more participatory approach, also referred to as Participatory Irrigation Management
(PIM). The Government of Andhra Pradesh and donor organizations expected that the
establishment of Water User Associations (WAUs) would contribute to (a) effective
institutional change and (b) improved cost-recovery once these associations would be
responsible for management of canal irrigation system, while maintaining technical
support from – or working in collaboration with - the Irrigation Department. The
restructuring and redesign of legal and institutional arrangements for allocation and
distribution water resources has, however, not been an easy task: institutional reforms
at multiple levels of governance is by definition a complex process due to the variety
of actors and their interests.
Due to the success often attributed to the reforms, the reform model in Andhra
Pradesh was quickly labeled as the ‘AP model’ of irrigation reforms. Andhra Pradesh
was the first state in the country to enact legislation known as the Andhra Pradesh
Farmers Management of Irrigation Systems Act (APFMIS Act) in 1997. This Act
legalized the formation of WUAs and their mandatory participation in the
management of irrigation systems. As a result more than 10,200 WUAs were
democratically elected as part of the reform programme; covering 4.8 million ha of
irrigated areas in the state. 
The reforms were not only motivated by the state’s response to poor performance
of the irrigation systems, but also strongly encouraged by World Bank lending policies
(Nikku, 2007, p.5&7). They fitted well with the neo-liberal policy to scale down
irrigation bureaucracy, create water markets or increase water charges; and to transfer
the operation and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure and the water distribution to
farmer organization or water user associations (Nikku, 2007, p. 7). As an external
funding agency, the World Bank played a crucial role in the design and
implementation of the reform. The reform of the irrigation sector in Andhra Pradesh
had a strong commitment from the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, Mr. Chandra
Babu Naidu, who hoped that successful reforms would increase his political credibility
(Reddy & Reddy, 2002). 
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3. MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: POLICY ACTORS AND POLITICS
The main actors within the irrigation system are the water users or mainly the
irrigators, WUA representatives, political leaders and the irrigation and revenue
bureaucrats. The administration of irrigation sector is carried out at three levels. First
the highest level of government supervision comes from the Minister of Major and
Medium Irrigation, and the Minister of Minor Irrigation. Second, at bureaucratic level,
there is Principal Secretary of Irrigation and Command Area Development (CAD)
Department, and three to four secretaries. All of them belong to the Indian
Administrative Service and influence policy making and implementation. The second
level is made up of the heads of several departments, the Engineer in Chief of
Irrigation and Administration, the Director General of the Water and Land
Management, Training, and Research Institute, the Commissioner of Command Area
Development Authorities (CADA), and the Director of the Groundwater board. The
third level is responsible for field operations at the system level. The Chief Engineer
(CE) is the head of the system level operations. The CE is assisted by Superintending
Engineers. One or more districts fall under an irrigation circle and are under the
control of a superintending engineer (SE). Eache irrigation circle is divided into
irrigation divisions headed by an executive engineer (EE). Traditionally each irrigation
division has three to four irrigation sub-divisions, each is managed by a deputy
executive engineer (DyEE). Each sub-division is again divided into four sections
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Landowners Tenants Other water users 
Water User Associations (WUAs) – each irrigation scheme 
comprises one or more WUAs which are delineated based on 
watershed principle. The WUAs are divided in 4 to 10 Territorial 
Constituencies with Territorial Committees, the members of which 
are elected or nominated by farmers
Distributory  Committee (DC) – a group of WUAs under a 
Distributory canal or under a group of small distributuaries. 
Members: all WUA presidents within the Distributory Canal
Apex Committee (AC) – State level decision making body.
 Chaired by: Minister for major / medium irrigation projects
Project Committee (PC) – Responsible for the management and 
distribution of irrigation water in the entire project command area. 
Members: all DC presidents
Figure 1: Multiple levels of participatory irrigation management in medium and large
irrigation schemes in Andhra Pradesh.
headed by the assistant Engineer (AE). One or more work inspectors (WIO and five to
six luskars support an AE or section officer. They work as gatekeepers and assist in
the distribution of water below the outlet level.
The basic structure for the Participatory Irrigation Management in medium and
large irrigation projects can be found in figure 1. At system level, the Project
Committee is supposed to communicate with the Superintending Engineer of the
Irrigation Circle or the Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Project. At the level of
secondary canals, the Distributory Committee communicates with the Deputy
Executive Engineer of the Irrigation Sub-Division. At the level of tertiary canals, the
WUA communicates with the Assistant Engineer of the Irrigation Section. Finally, at
the level of minor canals and pipe outlets, farmers and other water users communicate
with the luskars. Although the reform states to be non-political, access to political
parties is one of the factors affecting to the nomination and election of WUA leaders,
similar to one’s caste (upper caste), belonging to the village elite, and landholding
(Mollinga et al. 2004, p. 249; Nikku, 2003, p. 350). 
The relationships among the various actors and their contestation with the reform
policy within the irrigation reform policy space resulted in different outcomes than the
expected policy objectives. As it is not possible to deal with each and every
expectation and outcome, four particular policy-objectives are discussed in more detail
below. (a) increased user participation in decision-making (b) improved maintenance;
(c) higher rates of cess collection and thereby improved cost-recovery; (d) irrigation
expansion and (e) improved water distribution practices1.
A. Improved participation in decision making 
Under the reforms the rehabilitation and maintenance of irrigation structure was given
a high priority. The act mandates users’ participation in this process. The reform policy
aimed to strengthen the user associations by transferring duties that were traditionally
under the control of the irrigation department. The WUAs were given power to
implement the works with funds sanctioned by the government. At the same time, the
APFMIS act enhanced and legitimized the powers of irrigation bureaucrats to
supervise, monitor and provide technical and financial clearances for activities carried
out by the WUAs (Nikku, 2007, p. 129/130).
Contrary to the policy objectives, field evidence suggests that the irrigation users
were neither involved in decision making nor participated in irrigation works
voluntarily. According to the APFMIS Act, a General Body meeting of the WUA shall
be held at least twice a year. Additional meetings may be called (a) when requested by
the president or managing committee members with a majority resolution, (b) when
requested by members through a requisition signed by more than 2/3rd of the members
with voting rights, or (c) on the direction of the Government or from the Commissioner,
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1
“The objects of the farmers’ organization shall be to promote and secure distribution of water among it’s
users, adequate maintenance of the irrigation system, efficient and economical utilization of water to
optimize agricultural production, to protect the environment and to ensure ecological balance by involving
the farmers, inculcating a sense of ownership of the irrigation system in accordance with the water budget
and the operational plan” (GoAP, 1997, Art. 16, APFMIS Act).
the Command Area Development or the next higher tier of the farmers organization in
respect of matters relating to urgent public importance. In reality, during the period
studied, participation by the members in the WUA meetings was minimal, due to: 
• Difficulties to make the logistic arrangements for presidents who do not live near
the designated head quarter of the WUA where meetings are to be held;
• Spatial spreading of the WUAs membership base, which makes mobilization time-
intensive.  WUA presidents claim they do not have the manpower to mobilize all
members;
• Hierarchy in social status (caste- and gender differences) and legal status of tenants
(usually lower-caste) who do not own land;
• Opportunity costs of participation in meetings for agricultural laborers as compared
to daily wage earning opportunities;
• Absenteeism of absentee landowners whose land is cultivated by tenants, and
absenteeism of resident landowners whose primary occupation is not cultivation. 
B. Improved maintenance
The APFMIS Act states “scientific and systematic development and maintenance of
irrigation infrastructure is considered best possible through WUAs. These
organizations have to be given an effective role in the management and maintenance
of the irrigation system for effective and reliable supply and distribution of water”
(GoAP, 1997). The government issued an order on the 8th of August 1997, allowing
the WUAs to use government provided funds for immediate operation and
maintenance works. This included repairs such as desilting, weed removal,
embankment repairs, revetment, repairs of shutters, masonry, lining, clearing, oiling of
screw gearing shutters, painting of hoists and gates and emergent breach closing
works. The Irrigation department would remain responsible for the construction of
sluices, drops, regulators and measuring devices, and the rehabilitation and
modernization of the system. The findings from field research show that these
objectives were not met, largely due to serious constraints in the allocation and release
of funds for maintenance, which seem to have been aggravated by the multiple levels
of financial management. While in 1997 no funds were made available for irrigation
works, during the first years of the APFMIS (1998 and 1999) the government did
release funds for both rehabilitation and maintenance. The funds for irrigation works
were allocated uniformly to all WUAs across the state on the base of their command
area. For example, in April 1998, the government released a total grant of Rs. 1,064.7
million to the WAUs at a rate of Rs 247/ha for the total localized command area of
approximately 4.4 million hectares. According to government records, more than
22,000 works were taken up by WUAs and completed by 31st March 1998. During
1999 and 2000 the focus was entirely on the small rehabilitation works of the irrigation
structures. 49,000 works worth Rs. 4 billion were taken up at state level. However,
from 2000-2001 onwards, the WUAs were expected by to meet the costs of regular
maintenance works from internal resources and from the share of cess collection they
received from the concerned revenue department. Not surprisingly, the interest of the
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WUA to take up irrigation maintenance works decreased with the decline of funds
made available to the WUAs in subsequent years.
Contrary to the expectations from the government, many of the WUAs did not
prepare a maintenance plan, which describes the need and scope of the maintenance
activities to be carried out by WUA and Irrigation Department. According to the
formal prescriptions of the Act, the competent authority from the Irrigation
Department should prepare the estimates of the works by the end of February, and a
WUA General Body meeting should be conducted in March, to discuss the financial
expenditure for the completed year and the maintenance proposals for the following
year. The WUA leaders claimed that ‘the Irrigation Department neither insisted nor
assisted in preparing such plans’. The irrigation staff argued, ‘what is the use of
making such plans when we do not know the quantum of funds available’. The reason
for such statements was that both the irrigation department staff and WUA leaders
excessively depended on the government funding to carry out the maintenance works.
WUA presidents complained that the delays in cess remittance from the Revenue
Department did not allow them to carry out the works as planned and that irrigation
staff spent huge budgets through contracting in the absence of the Project Committees.
Local irrigation staff, on the other hand, expressed their difficulties in motivating the
WUA leaders to take up the activities without the necessary funds.
C. Cess collection and the establishment of the Joint Azmoish
The Joint Azmoish (JA) is a joint supervision of survey of irrigated command area in
a hydraulic unit. It is a joint survey conducted by the representatives of the WUA,
departmental staff members of irrigation, revenue and agriculture to agree and report
irrigated area and type of crop. The activities of each participating department are
jointly coordinated and are complimentary. As a result the Joint Azmoish is another
important arena where we could find the interplay of actor interests.
The irrigation reform policy legitimises for the first time the participation of WUAs
in the JA process. In 1999, the government issued order no 610, empowering the WUAs
to participate in the Joint Azmoish process. Participation of the Irrigation, Revenue and
Agriculture departments and the WUAs in Joint Azmoish was made mandatory. It was
expected by the policy makers that the participation of WUAs in the process of JA
would ensure correct reporting practices of the irrigated area leading to a higher rate of
cess collection. The participation of WUAs is also seen as an opportunity to forge
linkages between the participating agencies in irrigated agriculture. 
The policy objectives of the Joint Azmoish – correct reporting practices and higher
rate of cess collection – were not achieved. Among the participating departments
especially the Revenue Department did not show interest in the policy. The reason for
this is not yet clear. One of the potential explanations could be that the JA is a threat
to their traditional power of collecting cess from users directly. The Agricultural
Department acted in a laissez-faire manner. The Irrigation Department showed interest
but tried to control the process. The majority of WUAs did not play an important role
and were less interested to motivate users to pay the cess. They feared that too much
pressure on paying cess would jeopardize their re-election, in particular as long as the
promises for improved irrigation distribution and maintenance and operation were still
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not fulfilled. Although the policy objectives were therefore not met, their personal
interests were safeguarded. The leaders shared their concerns regarding the impact of
mandatory contribution of cess with the competent authorities, and worked out
informal procedures by which some of the WUA leaders themselves would deposit
money in the name of users’ contribution. Irrigation officers helped in retrieving this
money from state contributions by escalating the estimated costs for maintenance
works which were then conducted by the leaders on behalf of the WUA.
D. Irrigation Expansion
The state government claimed that during the period 1998 – 2000 more than 290,000
ha of ‘gap command’ was bridged as a result of irrigation reforms in the state (GoAP
2000). Research at local level did, however, not show evidence of the irrigation
expansion claimed by the government. It did show evidence that the positive
exaggeration of irrigation expansion data helped the government to construct the
popular perception that the reform policies yielded good results. The findings of
research at local level suggest a role by political executives of the then ruling
government in the social construction of data (Nikku, 2007, p. 169). The possible
reasons for manipulation of data are threefold: (a) practices by the luskars to report
low levels of discharge than in reality, allowing for an exchange of unaccounted water
to individual farmers or groups of farmers who are not entitled to more water; usually
with the consent of other irrigation officers; (b) official rules which makes assistant
engineers accountable for reporting illegal tapping and canal losses. By reporting
lower discharges, the unaccounted water can be exchanged for monetary gain, and
there is no need for exaggeration of the irrigated area; (c) external unofficial pressures
from political representatives and higher officials for additional water which can only
be accounted for by adjusting the data on water supply; (d) changes in cultivation
patterns, benefiting farmers cultivating wet-crops at the head-end areas, at the cost of
farmers at the tail-end cultivating irrigated dry-crops.
E. Water Distribution
A critical justification for irrigation reforms was to achieve improved water supply in
irrigation systems generally not operating at full supply. Water distribution and supply
was primarily under control of the irrigation department before introduction of
introduction of irrigation reforms. As we explained earlier, the irrigation reform policy
transfers the responsibility of water distribution to WUAs. With the government-
sanctioned budgets, the WUAs carried out minimum rehabilitation and maintenance
works. Though there were implementation problems in carrying out works, one could
see minor improvements in water flows as canal were cleaned and structures were
repaired. The practical outcome of these repairs should have been the improved water
flows, and that the WUAs have taken up responsibilities in the water distribution. The
field evidence suggests there is insufficient evidence of improved water distribution
practices in the study area, and that the irrigation staff still dominate the decisions
regarding water distribution. 
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The tail end farmers of Kesavapuram on Punyapuram major and of
Kambampadu and Chilukuru on Nidanapuram major claimed that their
situation has not changed since introduction of WUAs. The farmers stated that
they used to spend a lot of time and money on canal gasti (canal watch by
private people) to bring water from the head reaches to their tail-end plots. The
WUAs could not implement an operation plan. As a result, the gap command
has remained in the tail reaches of tertiary canals on Madhira Branch Canal. In
absence of water sharing rules, the tail-end farmers continued to be deprived of
their legitimate share of water (Nikku 2007: 163).
4. DISCUSSION
In the introduction, we stated that much of the localized support for, or resistance
against, the reforms is based on (proposed or realized) changes in the rules that
“operate configurationally to structure an action situation” (Ostrom, 1986, p. 19),
which were (1) position rules; (2) boundary rules; (3) scope rules; (4) authority rules;
(5) aggregation rules; (6) information rules, and (7) pay-off rules that prescribe how
costs & benefits are to be distributed between participants. Moreover, resistance
against particular elements of the reforms also manifests itself in the strategic
interpretation and bending of some of the rules which constitute the ‘action situation’.
Position rules: In the Andhra Pradesh reforms, changes were proposed in the
position of civil servants vis-à-vis farmers in water user organizations. The ‘farmers’
are, however, not a homogenous group of actors: caste, gender, size of landholding,
location of landholding, and residence have a clear impact on their position
(voting/non-voting; chance to be elected as president).
Also, when the government of Andhra Pradesh wanted to bring the job of the
luskar, the lowest tier of civil servants of the irrigation department, under the
supervision of the WUA, they strongly protested. The luskars feared that – with such
a shift – their identity as government servants in society was threatened, thereby also
the respect and protection from society. 
Position, Authority and Aggregation rules: The middle-level bureaucrats were not
consulted from the beginning and they perceived the reform programme as top-down,
with no direct benefits to them. For example, the governments’ plans to appoint
Superintending Engineers as PIM coordinators and District Consultants was resisted by
senior and middle level bureaucrats at district level, who feared that these new positions
would create hierarchical problems within the department, but also as competition to
their power and decision-making. Not surprisingly, they resisted the plans.
Scope rules: The higher-level irrigation bureaucrats realized they would benefit
from portraying a more positive picture of improvements in water distribution and
irrigation expansion in terms of more budgets. The irrigation reforms were, for some,
an opportunity to improve their career chances. At political level, there was pressure
to exaggerate the positive outcomes and underreport problems in terms of political
credibility. The mid-level irrigation staff realized their performance was assessed in
relation to their compliance with official rules, since irrigated area can be calculated
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based on discharge levels, crop type and soil type. They adjusted their reporting to the
outcome, to avoid inaccuracy due to illegal tapping practices and unaccounted favours.
Pay-off rules: The ‘farmers’ are not a homogenous group of actors: caste, gender,
size of landholding, location of landholding, and residence have a clear impact on the
perceived individual and collective costs and benefits of participation (pay-off rules)
and thereby the extent and nature of participation in decision-making and
implementation. The findings also indicate that within the Water User Associations,
commitment to participation and payment of cess by farmers is directly related to the
services provided, to location-specific water distribution (head-end and tail-end), and
to the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system. The WUA leaders
strategically weigh the costs and benefits of pressuring the farmers to pay the cess
against the chances of being re-elected, and sorted out a creative solution with the
consent of irrigation staff to solve the financial shortage. Here, the process of
nomination and election of WUA leaders (boundary rules) interact with the authority
and position of WUA leaders and their expected cost-benefit analysis of using their
authority.
Although applied here, the framework by Ostrom clearly has its limitations. Some
aspects could be arranged under more than one ‘rule’, while others seem to be outside
any of the rules mentioned. For example, in the case of Andhra Pradesh, the
institutional arrangements (Joint Azmoish) regarding the allocation and release of
financial resources for operation and the formal procedures for budgeting maintenance
and rehabilitation of the irrigation works seem to have played a key-role in the failure
to achieve the stated policy objectives. It is unclear from Ostroms categorization how
these financial arrangements contribute to the ‘action situation’.
5. CONCLUSION
What then, do these findings tell us about the context in which the reforms were
embedded?  The first two questions (about features of the reforms, policy actors and
politics of policy) have been addressed in previous sections. The remaining questions
(no. 3, 4, 5 and 6) from the introduction are still not resolved. Was there a common
understanding and shared perception of the (environmental, institutional and financial)
problems to be dealt with throughout the multi-governance system? Yes, there seem to
have been a common understanding of some of the core problems the water sector was
facing, prior to 1997. The farmers, irrigation staff, policy-makers and politicians (the
Chief Minister) understood the serious nature of the problems. Yet, the institutional
reforms also resulted in (perceived or real) threats for the status and position of
individuals and institutions throughout the multiple levels of (co-) governance, from
the lowest to the highest levels, both within the bureaucracy and within the multi-tier
farmer organizations. 
The fourth question was related to the competition to different tiers: how is the
competition between different tiers resolved, and with what pay-offs to the different
constituent parts? The research shows that competition between different tiers in
irrigation management in Andhra Pradesh is not being resolved, but purposely used by
various actors to influence the outcome of water sector reforms, often in alliance or
with the consent of the next tier. The competition between the various governmental
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and non-governmental organizations represented in the JA (Irrigation Department,
Agriculture Department and Revenue Department) is more problematic, as well as the
competition between irrigation staff and WAU. The partial transfer of responsibilities
was challenged by the irrigation bureaucracy, claiming a lack of capacity and
commitment from the WUAs. 
The fifth question raised was: how does multi-level governance function in a
situation where the different tiers represent fundamentally different institutional basis
(traditional, charismatic, rational forms of government) and how does this affect the
outcomes? We will reformulate this question slightly different: how does multi-level
governance function in a situation where actors represent fundamentally different
institutional bases (elected and non-governmental versus staff of governmental
organizations)? The answer to can be found not in the differences but in the similarities
across different institutional bases. At the start of this article, we argued, in accordance
with Bache and Taylor that, “the nature of resistance to policy transfer will be shaped
by past practices and embedded interests” (Bache and Taylor, 2003, p. 283). The field
research in Andhra Pradesh confirmed that actors from different institutional basis all
mobilize individual and collective resources, networks and location in order to be able
to intervene and influence the policy implementation process to safeguard their
personal interests as opposed to the collective interest. 
Finally, can we say that institutional fragmentation leads to better outcomes (as a
result of ability to respond flexibly to local realities) or to worse outcomes (due to
regulatory unpredictability)? Yes, we have found indeed indications that irrigation
staff has been willing and able to respond flexible to individual requests for additional
water releases. It is important to note, however, that these strategies have been
beneficial for particular groups of farmers (head end, influential, with political ties) at
the cost of other groups of farmers (tail end farmers, small farmers). WUA leaders
have equally adjusted existing procedures, mindful of their political accountability
(read: the chance of being re-elected). In other words, while the water sector reforms
did allow for flexible responses to individual requests, these did not result in collective
benefits. The expectations with regard to the active participation and involvement of
water users in decision-making and implementation have not been accomplished. 
Bache and Taylor argue: ‘Thus, even where shared ideological goals/…/ raise the
prospects for successful policy transfer, existing policies and practices still place
constraints. Other factors constraining the potential for transfer include the stock of
political, bureaucratic and financial resources available to the recipient organization …”
(Bache and Taylor, 2003, p. 282). When applying this to the water sector reforms in
Andhra Pradesh, we can conclude that: “Where shared understanding and perceptions
of the problems across multiple levels of governance raise the prospects for successful
policy transfer, existing policies and practices still place constraints in reality”.
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